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Abstract
Three basic postulates for Quantum Theory are proposed, namely the Prob-
ability, Maximum-Speed and Hilbert-Space postulates. Subsequently we show
how these postulates give rise to well-known and widely used quantum results,
as the probability rule and the linearity of quantum evolution. A discussion of
the postulates in the light of Bell’s theorem is included which points towards
yet unsolved conceptual problems in the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics.
1 Introduction
Special Relativity theory and Quantum Mechanics are usually seen as indepen-
dent theories. They are even usually viewed as conflicting with each other, espe-
cially in the question of the locality/nonlocality nature of Quantum Theory. De-
spite this possible conflict a “peaceful coexistence” between both theories have
been explicitly recognized [1]. Here in the same spirit as [2] we propose three
postulates for Quantum Theory among which we include the relativity principle
of no faster-than-light speed transmission or alternatively no action-at-distance
principle. Thus we strengthen this peaceful coexistence to a necessary symbiosis
of both theories.
2 Postulates: General View
First we will very briefly enumerate our proposed postulates and subsequently
we will comment on them. We propose the following three postulates as the
physical roots of Quantum Theory:
1. Probability Postulate.- The physical results predicted by Quantum
Theory are probabilistic in nature, i.e. an observer only knows the prob-
ability of outcomes in any measurement done upon a quantum system.
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2. Maximum-Speed Postulate.- Physical phenomena, whatever they are,
show an upper bound in their transmission speed.
3. Hilbert-Space Postulate.- It corresponds to every physical system,
whether simple or compound, a Hilbert space, different operators upon
which represent the state of the system and the physical quantities to be
measured.
It is obvious that the third one lacks of the same clear physical content as
the other two. In our opinion, this responds to the unconlusive question of the
definitive interpretation of Quantum Theory and suggests that advancement
in this direction should necessarily clarifies the physical meaning behind the
Hilbert-space formalism. Notice that the projection postulate has not been
included. We firmly believe this postulate not to be a milestone in the physics
behind Quantum Theory.
2.1 Probabilistic Postulate
The probability nature of Quantum Theory has been one of its most outstand-
ing features since its very creation. Here we will show how this distinguishing
feature, far from being just a philosophical question, is fundamental in its math-
ematical formalism, namely in the evolution of quantum systems. In particular
we will show in section 3 how probability plays a fundamental role to establish
the linearity of quantum deterministic evolution.
For probability formalism to be correctly applied we must make sure that
Kolmogorov’s axioms are satisfied, something which has already been done [3].
This enables us to use well-known probabilistic concepts and results as, in par-
ticular, conditional probability and the theorem on compound probabilities [4].
2.2 Maximum-Speed Postulate
This postulate is one of the milestones of the theory of Relativity, particularly of
the theory of Special Relativity. In this theory it has fundamental mathematical
consequences, namely, the Lorentz transformations between inertial frames, a
keystone both in electrodynamics and in any theory incorporating relativity
principles.
It should be remarked that this Maximum-Speed postulate also enters in
the foundations of Special Relativity, so there’s quantum-independent evidence
to claim that it is a firmly established physical principle. We very shortly
include how this postulate appears in the deduction of Lorentz transformations.
If we have two reference frames and investigate what the possible coordinate
transformations are under the assumptions of homogeneity and isotropy of space
and time and the special relativity principle for inertial frames, we arrive at
transformations of the type [5]
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x′ =
x− V t√
1− V 2
η
(1a)
y′ = y (1b)
z′ = z (1c)
t′ =
t− V
η
x√
1− V 2
η
(1d)
where η is a positive constant with [Length]2[T ime]−2 dimensions, V is the
relative speed of the inertial frames and where we have chosen for concreteness
the X axis for the relative direction between the two frames. Once established
these coordinate transformations it is straightforward to realize that the exis-
tence of an upper bound for the velocity of any physical system, say c, determines
this constant [5]:
η = c2 (2)
Notice that this approach to Lorentz transformations not only singles out
the role played by the Maximum-Speed postulate but also do place Galilean
transformations under the same conceptual basis, the only difference being this
postulate. In Newtonian space-time it is assumed that there’s no upper limit
for the velocity, so η =∞ and we recover from (1) the usual Galilean transfor-
mations.
There has been previous work in the direction of using this Maximum-Speed
principle as a fundamental postulate in Quantum Mechanics, in particular to
demonstrate that it forces the quantum deterministic evolution to be necessar-
ily linear [2, 6]. Here we will argue that such a proof is indeed inconsistent,
but nevertheless this postulate can shed some light in the locality/nonlocality
question posed by Bell’s theorem and provide some insight into EPR theorem
and EPR elements of reality [7].
2.3 Hilbert-Space Postulate
This is beyond doubt the more mathematical postulate of the ones we propose
here. There’s no unanimous consensus about its physical meaning, this being
the origin of the different interpretations of the quantum formalism. Instead of
assuming any of these interpretations we have included it in its mathematical
form in order not to subrestipciously introduce hidden physical assumptions.
This postulate is two-fold. Firstly it is usually assumed that the state of
quantum systems is represented by vectors in a Hilbert space. We will only
claim that there exists a mathematical object related to the Hilbert space which
describes the state of the system. On the other hand operators defined upon
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the Hilbert space are associated with the physical quantities to be measured.
These operators are usually called observables whereas the measurable physical
quantities (naturally assumed as real numbers) are the elements of the spectrum
of these observables. Since the spectrum must be real, there must exist a spec-
tral resolution of the identity associated to each of these operators, thus they
are selfadjoint. Notice how this formalim naturally includes the possibility of
physical quantities having discrete values, a characteristic feature of Quantum
Mechanics.
Notice that as it has already been remarked [8] the Hilbert space appears as
the fundamental element. Not restricting ourselves to state vectors presents a
double advantage: on one hand it enables us to deal with subsystems of com-
pound quantum systems and on the other hand it also allows us to embrace
statistical mixtures (ensembles) of quantum systems under the same mathe-
matical formalism.
3 Postulates: Immediate Results
The choice of these postulates is justified with the following immediate results
which are readily obtained from them.
3.1 Probability Rule: Gleason’s Theorem
In standard textbooks (cf. e.g. [9]), besides adopting vectors in Hilbert space
as representing quantum systems it is also included as a postulate of Quantum
Mechanics that the probability of obtaining the result ak in measuring the ob-
servable A upon a quantum system in state |ψ〉 is Pr(ak;ψ) = |〈ak|ψ〉|2, where
|ak〉 represents the eigenstate associated to the eigenvalue ak of the observable
A. But as a matter of fact this is not a postulate, since by Gleason’ theorem
[10] we know that every measure µ associated to an observable A has the rep-
resentation µ(ak) = tr(ρPk) where ρ is a density operator (positive, selfadjoint,
unit-trace operator) and Pk is a projector associated to ak (Pk = |ak〉〈ak|).
In particular, if we are interested in defining a probability measure upon the
Hilbert space associated to a quantum system we will always be able to find a
density operator ρ such that
Pr(ak) = tr(ρPak) (3)
This theorem, in our opinion, clarifies different fundamental aspects of the
widely used quantum formalism. First the density operator ρ is the mathe-
matical object associated to the Hilbert space of a quantum system which was
referred to in section 2.3. Secondly, notice that the use of the density operator
formalism embraces the state vector representation as a particular case. This is
easily shown by noting that if ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| then
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Pr(ak) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|Pak ) =
= tr(|ψ〉〈ψ||ak〉〈ak|) =
= |〈ak|ψ〉|2 (4)
So that instead of using ρ we may use |ψ〉 to represent the state of the
system. The choice between ρ and |ψ〉 is particularly irrelevant for pure systems
(cf. below), since there’s no difference in the physical predictions. Notice that
for the time being we are not taking under consideration statistical mixtures of
states, so ρ represents a particular state of the system.
Be aware that we are using Gleason’s theorem in its original sense (cf. ap-
pendix), i.e. to show that you only have to postulate the existence of a measure
(probability in this case –Postulate 1) upon a Hilbert space (the one associated
to each physical system –Postulate 3) to arrive at a density operator. Thus the
well-known criticism to the proof of the impossibility of dispersion-free states
by resorting to Gleason’s theorem [11] does not apply here, since any state must
be expressed using exclusively the Hilbert-space machinery (Postulate 3).
The advantage of using ρ is double. First it allows within the same mathe-
matical formalism the analysis of ensembles of states. This is due to the linearity
of both the trace and the multiplication operations. Suppose that a system is
known to be in state ρk with probability qk (k = 1, . . . , n). Obviusly
∑
k qk = 1.
Then the probability of finding the value aj of the observable A upon a mea-
surement on this system will be tr(ρkaj) with probability qk, so applying the
theorem on compound probabilities we get
Pr(aj) =
n∑
k=1
qktr(ρkaj) (5)
from which by linearity we may write
Pr(aj) = tr
[(
n∑
k=1
qkρk
)
aj
]
(6)
Since
∑n
k=1 qkρk is selfadjoint, positive and of unit trace, it is a density
operator. The difference with the previously considered density operators stems
from the fact that ρ’s representing statistical mixtures are not idempotent, i.e.
ρ2 6= ρ (7)
whereas ρ’s of type ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| are. The nonidempotent density operators
represents mixture states whereas the idempotent ones are said to represent
pure states.
The second advantage appears in the study of compound systems. As we
have stated in the Hilbert-space postulate any physical system, whether simple
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or compound, is associated to a Hilbert space. So as it has been stated in section
2.3 we must associate a Hilbert space to a, say, double-compound system H12
and its corresponding observables are selfadjoint operators upon H12. But com-
pound means made up of simpler entities, which following the same postulate
should be associated to Hilbert spaces H1 and H2, so it is natural to use the
tensor product to build up the Hilbert space H12 associated to the compound
system: H12 = H1 ⊗ H2, since the tensor product conserves both the linear
structure and the scalar product necessary to have a Hilbert space.
Now the advantage of density operators over state vectors is rooted in the
fact that whereas in the latter formalism it is impossible to find a state vector
describing the state of one of the subsystems in physically interesting situations
(product density operators usually appear only as initial conditions and as soon
as both subsystems interact we are in the situation considered here), using
density operators it is always possible to find another density operator describing
the state of a subsystem. This is achieved by resorting to the well-known partial
trace operation:
ρ1 = tr2ρ12 ρ2 = tr1ρ12 (8)
Finally the derivation of the quantum probability rule has also been at-
tempted in the context of particular interpretations of Quantum Mechanics,
but these efforts have already been proven to be wrong [12], Gleason’s theorem
being a fundamental result in this respect. The necessity to introduce a prob-
ability measure is inevitable (cf. [12]), something which we have assumed in
postulate 1.
Notice that all these considerations have been made only resorting to postu-
lates 1 and 3, no further physics has been introduced beyond the one contained
in these assumptions.
3.2 Linear Deterministic Evolution
So far we have not introduced any axiom relating to the dynamics of quantum
systems. In this section we will consider the restrictions upon this dynamics
imposed by the previous postulates. To study the dynamics of a quantum
system we define a family of (super)operators {Φt} with t ≥ 0 that carries the
state of a system from a state ρ0 at an initial time t0 to a state described by ρt
at time t, i.e. Φt(ρ0) = ρt. Then it can be proven the following
Theor. 3.1. Under postulates 1 and 3, the family of superoperators {Φt}t≥0
denoting the dynamics of a quantum system satisfies the relation
Φt(q1ρ1 + q2ρ2) = q1Φt(ρ1) + q2Φt(ρ2) (9)
for every convex linear combination q1ρ1+ q2ρ2 of idempotent density operators
ρ1 and ρ2.
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Proof. Let’s proceed by parts. Let the quantum system described by ρ be a
closed system. Postulate 1 states that the physical information we obtain from
a quantum system is the probability of getting a certain (eigen)value of an
observable, say A. If the system is in a state q1ρ1 + q2ρ2, then by postulate 3
and Gleason’s theorem the probability of measuring the value aj at the initial
time is tr[(q1ρ1 + q2ρ2)Paj ] and at a time t is tr[Φt(q1ρ1 + q2ρ2)Paj ]. Now this
ρ always admits an ensemble interpretation, i.e. it may always possibly be
understood that the system is in state ρ1 with probability q1 and in state ρ2
with probability q2. This is proven in the following
Lemma 3.1. q1ρ1 + q2ρ2 always admits an ensemble interpretation for any ρ1
and ρ2.
Proof. As it has been showed in the preceding section a statistical mixture of
states ρ1 with probability q1 and ρ2 with probability q2 is represented by the
density operator q1ρ1 + q2ρ2 whatever ρ1 and ρ2 are. On the contrary given
q1ρ1+ q2ρ2 we cannot conclude that it represents a statistical mixture, but only
that within the set of all possible interpretations, the ensemble interpretation
must be present. This stems out from the fact that you can always construct
an ensemble of two arbitrary states ρ1 and ρ2 with arbitrary probabilities q1
and q2. Finally it must be remarked that all these deductions only resort to
postulates 1 and 3.
Now under the ensemble interpretation the probability of getting the value
aj after a time t is given by the theorem on compound probabilities and the
linearity of the trace operation pt(aj) = tr[(q1Φt(ρ1) + q2Φt(ρ2))Paj ] for any
Paj . We then conclude that Φt(q1ρ1 + q2ρ2) = q1Φt(ρ1) + q2Φt(ρ2) under this
interpretation.
Let now the evolution of the quantum system described by ρ be non-linear, i.e.
Φt(q1ρ1 + q2ρ2) 6= q1Φt(ρ1) + q2Φt(ρ2). Then it is clear that ρ does not admit
the ensemble interpretation in clear contradiction to the previous lemma. Thus
the evolution for a closed quantum system must be linear.
Let now the quantum system described by ρ be an open system. Then as
it is proven in [6, 13] its corresponding density operator ρ ≡ ρS can always be
obtained by enlarging its Hilbert space HS adjoining an auxiliary Hilbert space
Haux in such a way that ρS = trauxρS,aux, where ρS,aux is the density operator
corresponding to HS ⊗ Haux. This settles the impossibility of distinguishing
proper from improper mixtures [8] by local operations. The adjoining is made
in such a way that the system plus the auxiliary system can be consider a
closed system. Then any family of evolution operators ΦSt defined over HS can
be obtained by tracing out over the auxiliary Hilbert space Haux:
ΦSt (ρS) = traux[Φt(ρS,aux)] (10)
So we can apply the previous result to Φt, then by the linearity of Φt and
traux we have
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ΦSt (q1ρS,1 + q2ρS,2) = q1Φ
S
t (ρS,1) + q2Φ
S
t (ρS,2) (11)
A few comments should be made. For the proof to hold it is essential to con-
vince oneself about the existence of at least one closed quantum system. From
a conceptual basis this is a delicate question. For instance, the program of de-
coherence recognizes the notion of open system as fundamental in the analysis
of the evolution of any quantum system [14]. But with relation to the foun-
dations of Quantum Theory, two comments must be remarked. First even in
decoherence program a closed system must be invoked for the quantum for-
malism to be applied, i.e. to use Schro¨dinger equation we must have a closed
system. So to deny the existence of closed systems invalidates the possibility
of using Schro¨dinger equation. Second by definition there’s at least one closed
system, namely the Universe. This second argument can be refuted by denying
the possibility of using Quantum Theory to describe the evolution of the Uni-
verse, which amounts to restricting the validity of Quantum Theory, something
beyond its present status.
Note that we do not endow the density operator with any particular inter-
pretation. Only the possibility of the ensemble interpretation is necessary, the
necessity of it stemming out from the fact that one can always construct an
ensemble of two arbitrary states with arbitrary probabilities.
Finally in [6] an alternative proof for this same result is given, which seems to
violate postulate 2. In particular Gisin claims that “by measuring [observables]
A or B on the system represented by the Hilbert space κ [Haux in our notation],
one forces the system represented by H into [one mixture or another]”. But as
we will argue in the next section, any local action we make upon the auxiliary
system will have a null effect on the system S, due to postulate 2. Note also that
if postulate 3 is changed, this result does not necessarily follow. For instance,
in stochastic models (cf. e.g. [15]) the evolution might be nonlinear. Here we
have shown how the probabilistic character of quantum predictions along with
the expression of a quantum state through the Hilbert-space formalism suffices
to restrict the evolution of a quantum system, leaving as the only possibility
that the latter be linear.
3.3 Maximum-Speed Postulate: Criticizing EPR Elements
of Reality and Reunderstanding Bell’s Theorem
3.3.1 Marginal and Conditional Probabilities
To illustrate how this postulate enters into a typical quantum-mechanical sit-
uation we will discuss the following ideal experimental setup which is used as
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Figure 1: Ideal experimental setup for Maximum-Speed postulate discussion.
an exercise in [16] and which is very close to the arbitrarily fast telephone line
built in [17]. Cf. fig. 1.
An EPR source sequentially produces pairs of spin 1/2 particles in singlet
state. Then the left ones are directed to a Stern-Gerlach apparatus which can
be oriented either along the Z or the X axis at a local observer’s will. The other
particles are left to travel to a spatially separated region of the former where
it will enter a Mach-Zender interferometer with a spin-flipper in its upper arm
and in which the first beam-splitter works as a semitransparent mirror if the
particle has positive or negative spin component along the Z axis, as a fully
transparent glass for particles with negative spin component along X axis and
an opaque mirror for particles with positive spin component along X axis:
|z±〉 → 1√
2
[|upper beam〉 ± |lower beam〉] (12)
|x−〉 → |lower beam〉 (13)
|x+〉 → |upper beam〉 (14)
A bunch of pairs as numerous as to build an interference pattern is produced
in the EPR source and all the left partners are subsequently measured by a local
observer with the Stern-Gerlach magnet oriented along one particular axis. The
right partners are then left to enter the interferometer. It is straightforward
to realize that if the particles entering the interferometer have positive Z com-
ponents, then an interference pattern should be expected on the screen S and
analogously if they have negative Z component (cf. fig. 1). On the contrary if
they have components along the X axis, no interference pattern should appear
on S. Thus the interferometer may be naively expected to be used to discern
whether the bunch of particles R have spin component along the Z or along the
X axis. Now due to spin conservation and the fact that each pair has been pre-
pared in a singlet state (S = 0), if particle R for each pair has spin component
along Z then the corresponding particle L will have opposite spin component
along Z and the same for the X axis. Apparently (and incorrectly as we will
show) we can conclude that if the left observer chooses to measure the, say, Z
components of a bunch of particles L, then inevitably an interference pattern
will show up on S and the observer of this screen can immediately infer which
the choice of his left partner was (to measure along Z or X axis), even if they
are spatially separated and do not communicate with each other.
9
We will discuss how postulates 1 and 2 prevents the interference pattern from
appearing on the screen, thus also preventing the right observer from inferring
along which axis the left observer chose to measure. We argue that this lack
of interference reflects the fact that the data obtained by the interferometer
(provided there is no exchange of information) enables the right observer only
to detect marginal probabilities and not conditional probabilities because the
particles entering the interferometer carry no information about the result of
the left measurement, this being a consequence of postulate 2.
The argument firstly makes use of postulate 1 by claiming that the only
physical quantity to be measured by the interferometer is the probability that
the particle entering it have positive or negative spin components along a par-
ticular axis. Now since usual concepts of probability theory are to be applied
[3] and since an observer at the right region is spatially separated from the left
one, this probability can only be chosen out of two possible probability mea-
sures, namely the marginal probability and the conditional probability (cf. [4]),
thus joint probabilities are excluded. The first one expresses the probability
of getting σRz = ±1 irrespectively of the results of the particle L. The second
one expresses the probability of getting such physical values conditioned on the
results obtained in the left measurement. Analytically, we must make a choice
between Pr(σRz ) and Pr(σ
R
z |σLz ). Physically this reflects two different circum-
stances: right particles carrying or not information about the result of the left
measurement. Postulate 2 enters now into the picture by assuring that, since
there’s no communication, the data provided by the interferometer can be used
only to construct marginal probabilities and not conditional ones. The latter
may have been expected since particle L has been measured before particle R
enters into the interferometer and one may be inclined to think that it carries
information about the result, but it is postulate 2 (or some similar version of
it) which precludes this possibility from realizing. Note that we do not discuss
how to calculate probabilities (whether marginal or conditional) but which ones
are to be assigned to the data provided by the interferometer without commu-
nication.
Furthermore, postulate 2 clearly prevents the interference pattern from ap-
pearing on the screen. An interference phenomenon is obtained only if the
particles entering the Mach-Zender device have components along the Z axis.
But since not having communication it is impossible to know it they have pos-
itive or negative spin components (postulate 2 once more) the probability of
arriving at a point x of the screen will be given by:
Pr(x) = Pr(x|σRZ = +1)Pr(σRZ = +1) +
+ Pr(x|σRZ = −1)Pr(σRZ = −1) (15)
where we have applied the compound probabilities theorem (cf. [4]). The
conditional probabilities Pr(x|σRZ = ±1) are quantum probabilities obtained
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using eqs. (12) and the a priori probabilities Pr(σRZ = ±1) = 1/2 since we do
not know the result of left measurements. Thus
Pr(x) =
1
2
[|〈x|up.b.〉|2 + |〈x|lo.b.〉|2] (16)
i.e. no interference is obtained, where
|up.b.〉 ≡ |upper beam〉
|lo.b.〉 ≡ |lower beam〉
Note that the Maximum-Speed postulate has been used at three levels. First
to recognize that any probability to be measured by an observer makes reference
to observables corresponding to that observer. In other words, observer R has
no access to joint probabilities, but only to probabilities referring to spin com-
ponents of particle R. Secondly, this postulate is also used to discern between
marginal and conditional probability measures. Finally to perform calculations
of probabilities where quantities referring to (possibly spatially) separated sub-
systems are involucred.
3.3.2 Internal Consistency and Bell’s Theorem
The appearance of postulate 2 as a postulate for Quantum Theory should con-
cern the careful reader who is aware of Bell’s theorem. How is it possible that
Quantum Theory, not being a local realistic theory (Bell’s theorem), incorpo-
rates a postulate like that. Thus are the preceding postulates self-consistent?
In order to assess this question we will focus on GHZ’s formulation of Bell’s
theorem [18, 19]. We will show how the three previous postulates jointly with
the EPR elements of reality are inconsistent. We will settle the theorem step
by step so that a further critique could be straightforwardly built upon it.
Let us recall the definition of EPR element of reality [7]: “If, without in
any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability
equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of
physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity”. If a quantity A is an
element of reality we will denote it as [A]. Under the three previous axioms and
the latter definition Bell’s theorem reads as follows:
Theor. 3.2 (Bell’s theorem). The set of postulates 1, 2 and 3 and EPR
elements of reality are logically incompatible.
Proof. Let a quantum system compound of three spin-1/2 particles be described
by the so-called GHZ state
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|z + z + z+〉 − |z − z − z−〉) (17)
11
where henceforth |n±〉 will denote the state with positive/negative spin com-
ponent along the n axis.
The set of all possible events may be divided into the four disjoint sets of
results:
S1 σ
(1)
y · σ(2)y = +1 σ(1)y · σ(3)y = +1 σ(2)y · σ(3)y = +1
S2 σ
(1)
y · σ(2)y = +1 σ(1)y · σ(3)y = −1 σ(2)y · σ(3)y = −1
S3 σ
(1)
y · σ(2)y = −1 σ(1)y · σ(3)y = +1 σ(2)y · σ(3)y = −1
S4 σ
(1)
y · σ(2)y = −1 σ(1)y · σ(3)y = −1 σ(2)y · σ(3)y = +1
Note that these four disjoint sets are equiprobable, thus P [Si] = +1/4 ∀i.
Let now the three particles be spatially separated from each other so that
by postulate 2 no physical phenomena can interrelate the three parties, i.e. no
possible physical influence from one particle on the others can be established.
Then for event S1 the following chain of implications can be readily proven
P (σ
(1)
x = +1|σ(2)y · σ(3)y = +1) = 1
P (σ
(2)
x = +1|σ(1)y · σ(3)y = +1) = 1
P (σ
(3)
x = +1|σ(1)y · σ(2)y = +1) = 1


(a)⇒


[
σ
(1)
x
]
= +1[
σ
(2)
x
]
= +1[
σ
(3)
x
]
= +1


(b)⇒
[
σ(1)x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x
]
= +1
(18)
where to calculate probabilities postulates 1 and 3 have implicitly been used
(see above), to establish implication (a) the definition of EPR element of re-
ality has been applied and where implication (b) elementarily follows from its
premises. Equally for events S2, S3 and S4 similar chains can be posed:
P (σ
(1)
x = +1|σ(2)y · σ(3)y = +1) = 1
P (σ
(2)
x = −1|σ(1)y · σ(3)y = −1) = 1
P (σ
(3)
x = −1|σ(1)y · σ(2)y = −1) = 1


(a)⇒


[
σ
(1)
x
]
= +1[
σ
(2)
x
]
= −1[
σ
(3)
x
]
= −1


(b)⇒
[
σ(1)x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x
]
= +1
(19)
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P (σ
(1)
x = −1|σ(2)y · σ(3)y = −1) = 1
P (σ
(2)
x = −1|σ(1)y · σ(3)y = −1) = 1
P (σ
(3)
x = +1|σ(1)y · σ(2)y = +1) = 1


(a)⇒


[
σ
(1)
x
]
= −1[
σ
(2)
x
]
= −1[
σ
(3)
x
]
= +1


(b)⇒
[
σ(1)x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x
]
= +1
(20)
P (σ
(1)
x = −1|σ(2)y · σ(3)y = −1) = 1
P (σ
(2)
x = +1|σ(1)y · σ(3)y = +1) = 1
P (σ
(3)
x = −1|σ(1)y · σ(2)y = −1) = 1


(a)⇒


[
σ
(1)
x
]
= −1[
σ
(2)
x
]
= +1[
σ
(3)
x
]
= −1


(b)⇒
[
σ(1)x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x
]
= +1
(21)
Now since these four cases (each chain corresponds to one Si) exhaust all
possibilities, we arrive at the conclusion that with probability 1 the quantity
σ
(1)
x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x must have an element of reality, and its value must be[
σ(1)x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x
]
= +1 (22)
But applying quantum formalism (postulates 1 and 3) we may also calculate
P [σ
(1)
x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x = +1] = 0, since P [σ(1)x · σ(2)x · σ(3)x = −1] = 1. Thus the
hypotheses are self-contradictory.
It should be remarked that this same scheme can be applied to Hardy’s [20]
and Cabello’s [21] versions of Bell’s theorem.
3.3.3 Analysis of Bell’s theorem
How is it then possible to overcome this contradiction? Are we necessarily to
abandon one of the hypotheses (or even more than one)? The commom view is
to claim that the locality principle (postulate 2) does not hold any more in the
quantum realm, though some refinements of the concept of locality may also be
found [22]. From the previous proof of Bell’s theorem it should be clear that the
crucial point and more controversial step is the implication (a), implication (b)
following elementarily from the conclusions of (a). As a matter of fact, if locality
drops out and a possibility of mutual influence (though strange as it may be)
is established, then (a) does not follow and the inconsistency wipes out. This
is the typical situation in which a reduction postulate is taken into account.
The influence is settled in such a way that no information about the result
can be recovered by local measurements upon the spatially separated influenced
partner. We address here instead the possibility of precluding implication (a)
by an epistemological distinction in the definition of EPR elements of reality.
The epistemological distinction we propose to introduce in the definition of
EPR elements of reality concerns the concept of probability to be used to estab-
lish the certainty of the prediction of a physical quantity. Following a minimal
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quantum formalism (postulates 1 and 3) it is clear that in general a quantum
system does not possess any of its possible results prior to a measurement upon
it (cf. [23, 24, 25]), so that the final value registered by the measuring device is
the product of the interaction between the system and the apparatus. In addi-
tion since all known interactions are local [26] this apparatus-system interaction
must also be local, thus we only have access to local information. This, as it
have been argued before, is revealed by the fact that probabilities directly ac-
cesible to the experiment are marginal probabilities never conditional ones and
this is theoretically justified by postulate 2. We want to stress the fact that this
locality does not preclude quantum correlations like e.g. for the GHZ state. We
are thus left with a highly paradoxical situation: on one hand all interactions
in Nature are local even in the quantum realm and on the other hand correla-
tions are present even when the correlated values for spatially separated systems
are established through local interactions with measuring apparatus. In these
sense these so-called quantum correlations are nonlocal. We believe that this
locality/nonlocality dualism can help to better understand the inconsistency
previously depicted.
The main idea is to realize that marginal probabilities are more fundamen-
tal from a rigorous epistemological point of view than conditional probabilities.
Again we want to stress the fact that this does not invalidate the latter, it only
partially reduces its epistemological value. Note that this distinction paral-
lels the previous locality/nonlocality dualism. Fundamental locality is revealed
through marginal probabilities, i.e. probabilities directly accessible to the ex-
periment whereas the nonlocal character of quantum correlations is established
using conditional probabilities. If we want to formulate a notion of how physical
processes take place in Nature, would it not be more natural to limit this notion
to information directly accesible to the experiment? In some approximate sense
this is analogous to the situation relating Maxwell’s demon and classical entropy
(cf. e.g. [27]): if an entity such as Maxwell’s demon existed then in principle
it would be possible to decrease entropy, though the non-decreasing of entropy
is a fundamental law of Nature (for many the most fundamental one). Note
that the existence of this entity would only require to be able to distinguish be-
tween particles with high and low velocities. As a matter of fact a well-trained
person (if he/she were capable of seeing particles) could perform this task very
easily and however a closer analysis (see [27] for references) concludes that this
does not imply that entropy is actually decreased in fundamental processes in
Nature, i.e. Nature always works not decreasing entropy.
In typical situations as the ones depicted before it is clearly possible to send
the information obtained in one party over to the other(s) and the latter can
process this information to identify which events where conditioned by which
previous results. Thus in principle judging by the correlations it is possible to
establish an action-at-a-distance influence between both parties. But as in the
Maxwell’s demon paradox a closer analysis would reveal that interactions are
always local, thus neglecting the existence of the alleged action at a distance.
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Fundamental processes, i.e. those accesible to experiments tell us that Nature
always works locally. Notice once more that we are not neglecting the existence
of correlations, we only criticize the way of understanding how physical processes
take place in Nature with the definition of EPR elements of reality.
Analytically the distinction between the locality by which physical process
operate and the nonlocality of quantum correlations is proposed to be rooted
upon the difference between marginal and conditional probabilities. Thus if
conditional probabilities are used in the definition of EPR elements of reality
(conditional probability equals 1), we are reviving a Maxwell’s-demon-like crea-
ture and these elements of reality go beyond how fundamental processes take
place in Nature, but if only marginal probabilities are used (those accesible to
local experiments), then we may find a way out of Bell’s theorem conclusion,
since implication (a) is not justified.
Note that neither this is a complete negation of Bell’s theorem nor a negation
of quantum correlations. It is only an epistemological remark trying to single
out what shocking and puzzling features of Quantum Mechanics remain to be
well understood. How nonlocal correlations are established through spatially
separated acts of measurements prior to which no value can be assigned to each
party remains a mystery (at least for us). The sexagenary proposed reduction
postulate, an undetectable process with a completely unknown dynamics which
clearly violates Special Relativity (if it is to be considered a physical process
taking place in space-time), does not seem to us the definitive solution and we
believe that further efforts both in the theoretical and experimental sides should
be made to understand this paradox.
4 Conclusions
We have proposed a set of basic postulates for Quantum Theory. Two of these
involve clear-cut physical statements upon the nature of the quantities to be
predicted by the theory (Probability postulate) and the possible connection
among these different quantities (Maximum-Speed postulate). The last one
(Hilbert-Space postulate) shows a strong mathematical character, suggesting in
our opinion the lack of a definitive physical interpretation. Any attempt towards
new interpretations of Quantum Theory should, we believe, clarify the content
of this principle in more physical terms.
This choice of postulates has relevant consequences both for the formalism
and for its understanding. First Gleason’s theorem emerges from these assumed
principles in a natural fashion, thus providing the fundamental tool to express
the state of a quantum system, namely the density operator. Second the lin-
earity of quantum evolution follows from the probability and Hilbert-space pos-
tulates without resorting to any other physical assumption. Hence probability
and Hilbert space formalisms appear to be more restrictive than what can be
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thought at first glance. Finally, similarly to previous proposal (cf. [2]), a local-
ity criterion (Maximum-Speed postulate; already present in Special Relativity)
is proposed to enter into this basic set of postulates.
After proving Bell’s theorem from these postulates and the well-known def-
inition of EPR elements of reality, we have discussed how an epistemological
distinction between marginal and conditional probabilities can be introduced in
the identification of the previous elements of reality, thus relaxing Bell’s theorem
conclusions.
However the establishment of nonlocal quantum correlations remains a mys-
tery under this set of postulates and we conclude that further efforts should be
made to understand uncontroversially the process by which these correlations
set up.
Appendix A: Gleason’s theorem
For completeness we include the original statement of Gleason’s theorem [10]:
Gleason’s theorem: Let µ be a measure on the closed subspaces of a separa-
ble (real or complex) Hilbert space H of dimension at least three. There
exists a positive semi-definite self-adjoint operator T of the trace class
such that for all closed subspaces A of H
µ(A) = trace(TPA)
where PA is the orthogonal projection of H onto A.
Note that the theorem does not make statements about hidden-variable the-
ories or interpretations (cf. [28] for details about the role of Gleason’s theorem
in the hidden-variables subject). It is a purely mathematical result.
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